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ESSAY REVIEWS 
4 KUHN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE F 
THEORIES OF SCIENCE 
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and 
Change. By Thomas S. Kuhn. Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press, I977. Pp. xxiii+366. $I8.50/LI2.95. 
Although this collection contains very little that is new-only the preface 
and two of the fourteen essays have not previously appeared in print-it 
is likely to have an important influence on our understanding of Kuhn's 
approach to scientific change and on our understanding of scientific change 
itself.' Having so many papers collected in one place should help to prevent 
those inadequate, one-sided appraisals of Kuhn's ideas that have been so 
common in the past. And, even though the papers chosen for inclusion tend 
to be philosophical and programmatic rather than 'straightforwardly historical' 
(p. x), they reveal enough of the more important elements of Kuhn's thinking 
to make the task of developing a consistent account of his work as a whole 
an intriguing and challenging business. 
One of the more striking aspects of Kuhn's work is how much of it is 
shaped by his early experiences as a practising historian of science. What 
we find above all is the influence of his discovery in I947 of 'the connected 
rudiments of an alternative way of reading (historical) texts', according to 
which in order to understand why, say, Aristotelian physicists said what they 
did, it is necessary 'to some extent (to learn) to think like one' (p. xi and p. xii). 
This discovery, which-as Kuhn himself notes (p. xiii)-is a commonplace 
among historians, was for him nothing short of 'decisive' (p. xii), influencing 
many of his views about the correct way of practising history of science, the 
origins of modern science, and the nature of scientific change. 
The influence of the 'decisive episode' on Kuhn's view about the practice 
of history and his own practice is direct and unequivocal. If historians are 
to avoid distorting the history of science, he tells us their attitude should 
be 'neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical sympathy'. 
(This remark of Bertrand Russell's is quoted twice by Kuhn-on p. Io8 and 
p. I49.) As far as possible, historians should set aside the science that they 
know; they should study the textbooks and journals of the period they are 
investigating; they should ask what their subjects' problems were and how 
these came to be problems for them; they should ask what their subjects 
thought they had discovered and what they took the bases of these discoveries 
to be; they should pay particular attention to their subjects' apparent errors 
since these reveal more of the 'mind at work' than do ideas that modern 
science retains; etc. (p. I I o). 
In Kuhn's own case, there can be little doubt that 'the search for best, 
or best-accessible, readings' has indeed been 'central to [his] historical research' 
(p. xii). Maxims like those mentioned clearly motivate his attempt in 'Concepts 
of cause in the development of physics' to provide 'a schematic epitome of 
the four main stages in the evolution of causal notions in physics' (p. 24); 
his suggestion in 'Energy conservation as an example of simultaneous discovery' 
that 'a contemplative immersion in the works of the pioneers [in the development 
of the idea of energy conservation] and their contemporaries may reveal 
[among the almost innumerable factors that caused the pioneers to make 
the discoveries they did] a subgroup of factors which seem more significant 
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than the others' (p. 72); and his attempt in The Copernican revolution to 'provide 
at least preliminary evidence' for the position that 'the techniques developed 
by historians of ideas can provide a kind of understanding that science will 
receive in no other way'.2 
The discovery concerning the way history of science should be done is 
also the driving force in Kuhn's seemingly tireless campaign against the 
whig historian, who 'stands on the summit of the twentieth century, and 
organizes the scheme of history from the point of view of his own day'.3 Here, 
what is especially interesting is not so much that Kuhn warns against reading 
the ideas and categories of the present into the past-we would expect that- 
but that he develops the demand in a particularly extreme form. In 
'Mathematical versus experimental traditions in the development of physical 
science', for instance, he observes that histories of technical specialities such 
as the history of electricity are 'often profoundly unhistorical' since they 
group together phenomena which have only recently (e.g. since the seventeenth 
century) been seen to constitute a single subject matter (p. 33). 
Somewhat less obvious is the bearing of Kuhn's discovery on the relationship 
of the philosophy of science to the history of science. Unlike certain 
historically-oriented philosophers of science who agree with Lakatos that 
'history of science without philosophy of science is blind',4 Kuhn holds that 
it is no less anachronistic to read back contemporary philosophy into the 
history of science than it is to read back contemporary science into it. For 
him, 'what Lakatos conceives as history is not history at all but history 
fabricating examples',5 and 'the living movements in philosophy of science. . . 
particularly as the field is currently practiced in the English-speaking world 
... [are] more likely to mislead than to illuminate historical research' (p. I I). 
(Of course, Kuhn does not deny that some knowledge of philosophy may 
be useful to historians whose subjects are concerned with philosophical or 
philosophy-related issues (cf. p. io), nor that the results of the history of 
science can and should have an important bearing on the philosophy of science 
(cf. p. I 9) .) 
These points of Kuhn's, at least in general outline, seem to me to be 
important and well-taken. Rather less convincing is his observation that 
what he had discovered in the summer of 1947 was the hermeneutic method 
(p. xiii). It may be true, as Kuhn claims (p. 5) and William Dray and others 
have argued at length, that the role of general laws is strictly limited in history, 
but this is not to say that historians practise the hermeneutic method. What 
the 'decisive episode' shows is that historians should attempt to develop 
plausible, coherent, undistorted accounts of the available historical data 
(cf. p. xii); it does not show that the methods they use to understand texts 
are different from the methods that are used to understand other phenomena. 
Another way in which the 'decisive episode' has influenced Kuhn's 
views can be discerned in his account of the origin of modern science. At 
the time that he realized that there are alternative ways of reading texts, 
he also came to the view that during the seventeenth century there had been 
'a global sort of change in the way men viewed nature and applied language 
to it' (p. xiii). Hypothetical sympathy is required to understand pre-seventeenth- 
century mechanics not because it is primitive, but-in Butterfield's words- 
because scientists, during the transition to modern science, put on 'a different 
kind of thinking cap' and picked up 'the opposite end of the stick'.6 
Almost as soon as he had formulated this position, however, Kuhn seems 
to have realized that it was in serious need of qualification (cf. p. 35, n. 3). 
If the transformation of science in the seventeenth century involved a new 
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way of conceptualizing old data rather than the accumulation of new data, 
we seem forced to treat the experimental work undertaken during this period 
as unimportant or, following Alexandre Koyre, as a fraud (p. 46). Although 
the decisive episode suggested that Koyre and Butterfield were right in holding 
that the Scientific Revolution was a revolution of ideas, Kuhn realized- 
as he put it himself later on-that 'other vitally important things also happened 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' (p. 4I). 
Kuhn's response to this difficulty is as important as it is simple. It is 
that we should distinguish the classical sciences (astronomy, harmonics, 
mathematics, optics, statics and the study of local motion-cf. pp. 36-9) 
from the Baconian sciences (heat, magnetism, electricity, chemistry, etc.- 
Cf. p. 47), and restrict the 'new thinking cap' idea to the classical sciences. 
'[If] one thinks of the Scientific Revolution as a revolution of ideas', Kuhn 
remarks, 'it is the changes in these traditional, quasi-mathematical fields 
which one must seek to understand' (p. 4I). Put otherwise, Kuhn's point 
is that we can alleviate the tension in Butterfield's work between those chapters 
in which the 'new thinking cap' idea is to the fore and those in which the 
issues are treated in an essentially traditional manner by noticing that the 
former have to do with the classical sciences, and the latter with the Baconian 
sciences (cf. p. 35, n. 3, and p. I3I, n. 2). (This view is developed in Kuhn's 
work in various places; cf. especially pp. 35-9, I i 6-I 8, I 36-7, and 2 I 3-2 I) . 
Notice that this account of the origins of modern science dovetails with 
the account of science Kuhn develops in The structure of scientific revolutions. 
Here cultural and socio-economic factors are seen as playing an important 
role in the establishment of new areas of scientific investigation, while sciences 
that have already achieved a significant body of technical doctrine are seen 
as being transformed not by the discovery of new data but by the 
reconceptualization of data already at hand. Although in The structure of 
scientific revolutions Kuhn is concerned primarily with the kind of change that 
took place in the classical physical sciences in the seventeenth century, and 
in chemistry in the eighteenth century, it is not his view, as some critics have 
supposed, that the development of science is immune to external influences 
(cf. p. xv). 
Limiting the Koyre-Butterfield thesis to the classical sciences certainly 
enhances its plausibility. However, we may still wonder whether Kuhn's 
approach to these matters is entirely satisfactory. For, on Kuhn's own account 
of the classical and Baconian sciences, transitions involving new observations 
and transitions involving 'new concepts' occur in both kinds of science; it 
is not the case that the classical and Baconian traditions are free of, respectively, 
experimental and conceptual considerations. Experiment occurred in the 
classical sciences but played a smaller role and tended to be more often designed 
to show what was already known than to find out how nature would behave 
(p. 43); to have deeper roots in tradition (p. 45), and to be more closely keyed 
to the theories which had called them forth (pp. 45-6). On the other hand, 
the Baconian sciences on occasion involved significant conceptual developments; 
it is, after all, no mean achievement to realize that lightning, the amber 
effect, and the torpedo (electric eel) should be grouped together as electrical 
phenomena (cf. pp. 33, 46). Such considerations suggest that it would be a 
mistake to associate the traditions characterized by Koyre and Butterfield 
too closely with the transformation of the classical sciences in the seventeenth 
century. 
Kuhn's distinction between the classical and Baconian sciences also 
figures prominently in his discussion of Merton's thesis that the Puritan ethic 
4 
This content downloaded from 137.122.8.73 on Sun, 15 Mar 2015 19:31:16 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
292 Essay Reviews 
was especially congenial to the development of science. Just as the appeal 
of the Koyre-Butterfield thesis may be enhanced by restricting it to the classical 
sciences, so, Kuhn argues, the appeal of Merton's thesis is 'vastly larger if 
it is applied not to the Scientific Revolution as a whole, but rather to the 
movement which advanced the Baconian sciences' (p. 59). Although it is 
wrong to think that 'an explanation of the rise of the new experimental 
philosophy is tantamount to an explanation of scientific development' (p. 136), 
it is reasonable to think that the investigation and manipulation of nature 
prompted by Puritanism played an important role in the development of 
the non-mathematical, Baconian sciences. In response to this line of argument, 
we can certainly agree that restricting the Merton thesis in the way Kuhn 
suggests enhances its plausibility. However, many difficulties remain, not 
least of which is that studies of the development of science in Britain-the 
centre for Baconian science (cf. p. 58)-have raised serious difficulties for 
the thesis. 7 Indeed, Kuhn himself remarks on the difficulty of identifying 
the Puritan 'ethos' (p. 59). 
No less important than the influence of the decisive episode on Kuhn's 
views about the practice of history and the origins of modern science is the 
influence of this episode on his views about the nature of scientific theorizing 
and scientific change. Concerning the first of these, what Kuhn learned is 
that theorizing may be of two distinct kinds: it may conform to tradition and 
involve the development and application of an already established conceptual 
scheme, or it may be revolutionary and involve the substitution of one thinking 
cap for another. In the terminology of 'The essential tension', what Kuhn 
came to appreciate is that scientific thought may be either convergent 
(fundamentally conservative) or divergent (fundamentally innovative) 
(pp. 225-7). Concerning scientific change, what Kuhn learned is that science 
progresses not only by the accumulation of new observational findings but 
also by intellectual upheaval. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Kuhn sometimes 
talks as though conceptual change is a part of the traditional picture of science, 
and sometimes as though it is not; this is what we would expect given that 
science is traditionally viewed both as an enterprise in which the kind of 
flexibility and open-mindedness characteristic of revolutionary, divergent 
thought is at a premium and as an enterprise which progresses by accumulating 
new observations rather than by the replacement of conceptual schemes. 
In 'The essential tension', written in 1959, these ideas are developed 
in an interesting way. The popular stereotype of the scientist as a divergent 
thinker, Kuhn argues, is incomplete and must be supplemented with 'the 
other face of [the] same coin', with the image of the basic scientist as a 'firm 
traditionalist' (pp. 236-7). As Kuhn puts it: innovative, divergent thought 
and tradition-bound, convergent thought are 'inevitably in conflict'; they 
give rise to an essential tension at the heart of the enterprise (pp. 226, 227). 
'Within the group', Kuhn remarks, 'some individuals may be more traditional, 
others more iconoclastic...; yet education, institutional norms, and the 
nature of the job to be done will inevitably combine to ensure that group 
members will, to a greater or lesser extent, be pulled in both directions' 
(p. 227, n. 2).8 Here the important point to notice is that Kuhn takes education, 
the textbook tradition, etc., as inculcating two discordant attitudes concerning 
correct scientific practice; he does not think of them as producing firm 
traditionalists, puzzle solvers, convergent thinkers. 
Between I959 and I96I when the first draft of The structure of scientific 
revolutions was completed and 'The function of dogma in scientific research' 
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was written, Kuhn's thinking concerning these matters underwent a remarkable 
transformation. The two modes of thought that Kuhn previously viewed as 
being inevitably in conflict were now seen as being characteristic of two 
distinct kinds of science. Tradition and dogma give rise to extended periods 
of convergent research, and, in the normal course of events, scientists are 
and should be firm traditionalists (puzzle solvers, convergent thinkers) 
engaged in what is essentially a mopping-up operation. Whereas in 'The 
essential tension' convergent and divergent research are held to be inevitably 
in conflict, we are now told that periods of normal (tradition-bound, paradigm- 
governed) science alternate with periods of extraordinary (revolutionary, 
paradigm-establishing) science. 
What prompted this shift in Kuhn's thinking? Internal evidence and 
Kuhn's own autobiographical remarks suggest that the new view originated 
in his investigation of the paradigm concept, and that Kuhn took the need 
for such a device to be established by the fact that 'periods governed by 
one or another traditional modes of practice must necessarily intervene 
between revolutions' (p. xvii, cf. also p. 227). Since it is implausible to attempt 
to account for extended periods of convergent research by 'enumerating the 
elements about which the members of a given conmmunity supposedly agree' 
(p. xviii), we are forced to invoke considerations having to do with the way 
scientists are trained, the influence of the textbook tradition and the like. 
Specifically, during the period under consideration it became Kuhn's view 
that normal interludes are to be explained by appealing to the idea of a 
paradigm. 'Once [this] piece of [the] puzzle fell into place', he tells us, 'a 
draft of [The structure of scientific revolutions] emerged rapidly'. 9 
There are two points about the view of The structure of scientific revolutions 
worth noting here. First, one of the many objections which have been urged 
against the view Kuhn puts forward there is, interestingly, that it fails to 
recognize that there is an interplay between tradition and innovation in science. 
As Feyerabend puts the point, we should 'speak of the normal component and 
the philosophical component of science and not of the normal period and the 
period of revolution'.I1 Second, Kuhn's argument leading to the conclusion 
that normal science is paradigm-governed can be criticized on the grounds 
that it fails to recognize the role of non-empirical, conceptual considerations 
in science. What Kuhn neglects to take into account is that scientists can and 
do recognize what Buchdahl has called the 'explicative' and 'architectonic' 
components of theory choice-i.e. considerations having to do with the 
intelligibility (widely construed) of a theory and its 'rationale'."I Since in 
the normal run of events changes of a conceptual nature are more difficult 
to sustain than changes which involve articulating and applying concepts 
already in place, why not think that there is an ever-present tension in science 
between tradition and innovation and take normal science to be nothing 
other than a surface effect? In the present context I think it not unfair to 
say that Kuhn's analysis of the decisive episode, in general so unerring, has 
failed him in a significant way. For as is well known, Kuhn's thinking from 
the very start has been dominated by the view that conceptual change, change 
which involves putting on a new thinking cap, is problematic in ways that 
change involving new observations is not. This point, incidentally, is underlined 
in a striking way in Kuhn's remark in the preface of the present volume that 
the decisive episode 'quickly led (him) to books on Gestalt psychology and 
related fields' (p. xiii). 
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In his more recent work, represented here -by 'Logic of discovery or 
psychology of research', 'Second thoughts on paradigms' and 'Objectivity, 
value judgement, and theory choice', Kuhn has again substantially modified 
his view. He now distinguishes between exemplars, concrete problem solutions 
(cf. p. xix), and disciplinary matrices-'most or all of the objects of commitment 
described in [The structure of scientific revolutions] as paradigms, parts of 
paradigms or paradigmatic' (p. 297); he no longer requires that paradigms 
(i.e. disciplinary matrices) be 'universal';Iz he allows that what he previously 
called pre-paradigmatic science may be paradigm-governed;I3 he has softened 
his views concerning incommensurability to allow for a certain amount of 
communication between proponents of different disciplinary matrices; I4 
and he has begun to lay greater stress on the similarities between his views 
and traditional views concerning theory choice (cf. p. 32I). Moreover, Kuhn 
has promoted certain themes of The structure of scientific revolutions to a more 
central position in his account. He argues that good scientific theories are 
characterized by values such as accuracy, consistency, congruence with other 
theories, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness (pp. 32I-2); that scientists regularly 
differ in their judgements concerning the relative merits of competing theories 
since, although the values mentioned are shared, they are applied and weighted 
in different ways (pp. 322-3); and that-provided the relevant group of 
scientists is sufficiently large-individual differences cancel themselves out, 
so that what comes to be accepted by the group as a whole is uncontaminated 
by subjective, non-scientific factors (p. 333). (The last of these claims is 
reminiscent of the Darwinian theory of scientific progress, rapidly sketched 
at the end of The structure of scientific revolutions, according to which revolutions 
are resolved by 'the selection by conflict of the fittest way to practice future 
science'.I5 A particularly clear and concise statement of the new view appears 
in 'Reflections on my critics' (not included in this volume): 'Group behaviour', 
Kuhn remarks in this essay, 'will be affected decisively by the shared 
commitments [i.e. by the kind of values alluded to above], but individual 
choice will be a function also of personality, education, and prior pattern of 
professional research'.i6 
As these ideas are introduced piecemeal, it is difficult to obtain a clear 
picture of Kuhn's present view. I think we may legitimately query some of 
its aspects: the proposed account of theory choice, for instance, appears to 
be excessively permissive, and it is unclear whether the account of scientific 
progress, with its appeal to what looks suspiciously like an invisible hand, 
has explanatory force.'7 On the other hand, however, the new account 
rehabilitates the important idea of there being an essential tension at the 
heart of the enterprise, and recognizes in plain terms that 'scientific knowledge 
is essentially a group product and that neither its peculiar efficacy nor the 
manner in which it develops will be understood without reference to the 
special nature of the groups that produce it' (p. xx; Kuhn's italics). Certainly, 
we would be ill advised to view Kuhn's recent work in the way some have: 
as a capitulation to the philosophers, or as a demonstration that the initial 
project was misconceived. 
It would be a mistake to think that there is only one satisfactory way of 
organizing Kuhn's ideas; his views are sufficiently subtle and complex to 
admit of alternative, even competing, interpretations. The point is that by 
tracing Kuhn's thought to the decisive episode we can obtain an indication 
of how some of the strands of his work are related to one another, and a better 
understanding of why he holds some of the views that he does. This kind of 
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approach, moreover, conforms tolerably closely to what Kuhn requires of 
the history of ideas. 
ANDREW LUGG 
University of Ottawa 
NOTES 
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is not stated unequivocally in 'The essential tension'. This is not particularly surprising, the 
essay being prepared within a month or so of Kuhn's recognition of the utility of the notion 
of a paradigm (cf. p. xix). In addition, it should also be noted that the idea does not, as one 
might expect, only appear in Kuhn's work prior to The structure of scientific revolutions: it can 
also be discerned in 'The function of dogma in scientific research', which was written after 
the first draft of the book was completed (cf. A. C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific change, London, 
I96I, p. 368). In The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edn., Chicago, I970, Kuhn refers to 
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concept', Science, I97I, I72, 708. 
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Like any collection of essays written over a period of time, this volume 
is repetitive. But repetition has its merits in highlighting the author's own 
assessment of what he considers to be important. The notion of scientific 
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